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ASSESSING JURISTOCRACY:
ARE JUDGES RULERS OR AGENTS?
GEORGE I. LovELY*

Scorr E. LEMIEUX**
Do increases in the number or scope of policy decisions that are
made by unelected judges automatically indicate that power has
shifted from elected officials in other branches to judges? On conventional accounts of judicial power in the United States, this question
seems uninteresting because the answer is obviously yes. We contend,
however, that the question is more important and more deeply puzzling than it seems on conventional accounts. Recent scholarship has
made it clear that interaction between judges and other officials cannot be understood as a zero-sum competition in which each branch
uses fixed institutional powers.
This Essay builds on a growing body of innovative scholarship on
separation of powers that has documented instances in which judges
exercise power only because elected officials made choices that expanded judicial discretion or expanded the institutional capacities of
the courts.' Such findings mean scholars cannot accurately measure
shifts toward juristocracy by simply counting the number of times a
pronouncement by a judge is the proximate cause of some policy
change. Scholars need first to distinguish instances where judges act
as rivals of other officials from cases where judges act as imperfect
agents for those officials.
While recent scholarship has documented numerous instances
where elected officials deliberately empower judges, scholars have not
worked out an adequate theoretical framework for addressing the
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puzzles that such empowerment creates.2 The result is that the old
paradigm is crumbling without an available replacement, and some
basic and once-settled questions about judicial power now seem to
have no readily available answers. Of course, scholars could make the
puzzles about power go away by definitional fiat, i.e., by deciding to
call any instance where Justices exercise real discretion and make
choices that change the direction of policy a case where judges exercise "power." This solution has some appeal but is ultimately unsatisfying. The concern that has led to scholarly fascination with judicial
review and juristocracy is not simply that judges exercise discretion
but also that increases in judicial discretion and influence somehow
distort or disrupt democratic politics. To understand that distortion
and disruption, scholars need to distinguish cases where judges exercise fixed powers to thwart the will of elected officials from cases
where more responsive officials deliberately choose to empower
judges.
Our goal in this Essay is to make some observations that identify
important puzzles and to introduce some conceptual distinctions.
Part I reviews some recent findings on the deliberate empowerment of
judges and introduces some of the methodological complications that
such findings create. Part II frames three important empirical questions that need to be asked before making final assessments ofjudicial
power. Part III introduces a distinction between two categories of
cases where legislators empower judges, a distinction that helps to
frame two different sets of concerns about the threat that judicial empowerment poses to democratic accountability.
I.

CONVENTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND NEW EMPIRICAL
WORK ON SEPARATION OF POWERS

Much recent and innovative scholarship on interactions between
branches of government has shown that the capacity ofjudges to exercise power is often dependent on contingent, politically motivated decisions by elected officials in other branches of government. In the
United States, scholars have traced broad shifts in the institutional

role and/or institutional capacities of the courts to deliberate choices
made by elected officials in other branches.' Other studies have fo2. See LOVELL, supra note 1, at 13-33 (outlining the reluctance of court scholars to
develop theories of interpretation and decisionmaking that take legislative deference to
the judiciary into account).
3. See, e.g., id. at 252-54 (describing the effect legislative choices have on judicial decisionmaking); MCMAHON, supra note 1, at 221-22 (concluding that the Roosevelt administration advanced its civil rights agenda through the Supreme Court); Gillman, supra note
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cused more narrowly on judicial decisions in particular policy areas
rather than broader institutional trends and have traced the power of
judges to resolve particular policy controversies to efforts by elected
officials to escape responsibility for certain kinds of divisive choices.4
In some instances, legislators invited the courts to resolve pressing policy problems that legislators were unable collectively to resolve;' in
other instances, legislators responded to divisive policy issues by passing highly symbolic statutes loaded with deliberately ambiguous language that empowered the courts. 6
These studies also reveal that instances where legislators try to
shift responsibility to judges can quite easily be mistaken for cases
where judges thwart the will of elected officials, in part because legislators who defer to the courts often have strong incentives to mask their
true intention.' For example, George Lovell's study uncovered instances where legislators used deliberate ambiguity to empowerjudges
in statutes that were advertised as pro-labor "reforms" that would take
power away from judges.8 When judges, quite predictably, made rulings that narrowed the reach of these statutes, they created a powerful
appearance of juristocracy. However, careful attention to legislators'
strategic choices revealed that the choices judges made were possible
only because legislators enacted statutory language that expanded judicial discretion while rejecting alternative proposals that would have
better cabined judicial power.9 Lovell's study also suggested that the
real impact of the courts is not always the difference between judges
choosing policy option A over policy option B but the fact that judges
help elected officials to divert political forces that might otherwise result in more dramatic changes in policy or more consequential political reactions. 10
1, at 511-13 (arguing that national political trends influenced and empowered the
judiciary).
4. See, e.g., LOVELL, supranote 1, at 255 (concluding that a factor leading to deference
was a deeply divided legislature); Graber, supra note 1, at 45-61 (detailing three instances
where legislators directly or indirectly invited the Supreme Court to settle three divisive
political issues: slavery, antitrust, and abortion).
5. See, e.g., Graber, supra note 1, at 46-50, 53-61 (describing the judiciary's role in
slavery and abortion).
6. See, e.g., LOVELL, supranote 1, at 99-160 (explaining the Court's role in interpreting
the meaning of an overly broad Clayton Act); Graber, supra note 1, at 50-53 (describing the
judiciary's role in antitrust law).
7. See Graber, supra note 1, at 37-45 (detailing the process by which legislators keep
socially divisive issues off the political agenda by deferring to the judiciary).
8. LOVELL, supra note 1, at 154-56, 249-51.
9. Id. at 104-60, 234-49.
10. Id. at 156-60, 258-61.
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The deliberate empowerment of judges also raises some important puzzles regarding the links between elections and judicial power.
Judicial power looks undemocratic or "counter-majoritarian" on conventional accounts that presume that elected officials watch helplessly
from the sidelines as insulated judges exercise fixed institutional powers. However, if the capacity of judges to rule on particular issues is
the result of choices made by elected officials, judicial power seems
better tethered to electoral processes. Moreover, elected officials
should have an easier time limiting the effects of judicial rulings that
grow out of deliberate empowerment than they will when judges use
fixed institutional powers over which legislators have no control. Expansions of jurisdiction or other grants of discretion can be reversed
through ordinary legislation if enough legislators decide that the expansion of judicial discretion no longer serves their interests.
On the other hand, the studies that have uncovered deliberate
efforts to empowerjudges have by no means put concerns about democratic accountability to rest. Instead of providing a rosy picture of
moldable and responsive courts, the recent studies uncovered a range
of previously overlooked pathologies in the mechanisms for democratic accountability that operate in other branches of government."
For example, Howard Gillman's study of the expansion of judicial capacities in the late nineteenth century reveals that one political party
empowered judges to entrench its power and shield itself from subsequent electoral shifts.1 2 Lovell's study of labor legislation showed that
legislators used deception to covertly shift responsibility for divisive
choices to less accountable actors and thus raised substantial concerns
13
about the transparency and responsiveness of legislative processes.
II.

FINDING JUDICLkL POWER

To provide an accurate picture of howjudges exercise power and
whether judges interfere with democratic process, scholars have to
identify cases where real conflicts between judges and other officials
occur and assess carefully the magnitude of any policy shifts brought
about by judicial rulings. The process of making such assessments is
difficult because the strategies that empower judges are sometimes attractive to elected officials only if those officials can create the illusion
that judges are usurping their power. Thus, key actors in these
processes can have strong incentives to create deception. As a result,
11. E.g., id. at 252-55; Graber, supra note 1, at 70-73.
12. See Gillman, supra note 1, at 521-22 (concluding that postbellum Republicans succeeded in entrenching their interests within the judiciary).
13. LOVELL, supra note 1, at 254-61.
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legislators' official statements of their preferences, and their votes on
legislation, cannot automatically be taken as straightforward indicators of their true preferences. To make more accurate assessments of
whether judges thwart the goals of elected officials, scholars have to
pay attention to the three questions outlined below.
A.

Are Judges Exercising Powers Only Because Elected Officials
Chose to Expand JudicialDiscretion?

Recent accounts of the deliberate empowerment of judges have
identified at least three important ways that elected officials add to
judicial capacities or judicial discretion.
1. Deliberate Statutory Ambiguity.-Becausejudges are institutionally positioned to make authoritative rulings on the meaning of statutes, statutory ambiguity allows judges to make discretionary choices
that influence policy outcomes. Of course, much ambiguity is the result of accidents or unforeseen circumstances and not deliberate efforts to empower judges. However, there are also instances where
legislators deliberately create statutory ambiguity by leaving key terms
undefined (e.g., failing to define what counts as a "restraint on trade"
or "commerce" when passing an antitrust law)," by failing to address
obvious interpretive questions that will inevitably arise (e.g., passing a
major law on disabilities without stating whether HIV counts as a disability), 5 by articulating conflicting policy priorities in parts of statutes
that are supposed to provide guidance to judges faced with interpretive questions, or by passing laws that create conflicts with existing laws
without explaining how those conflicts should be resolved.1 6
2. Provisions That Expand OpportunitiesforJudicialReview.-Legislators often include provisions in statutes that make it more likely that
judges will be in position to make policy choices. Legislators can create new courts or expand the jurisdiction of courts to cover more areas. 17 Congress also routinely incorporates provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act into regulatory statutes, including pro14. See Graber, supra note 1, at 50-53 (documenting how legislators left key policy
choices to the courts when passing the Sherman Antitrust Act).
15. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1998) (interpreting the Americans
with Disabilities Act to determine whether HIV constitutes a "disability" for purposes of the
Act).
16. See LOVELL, supra note 1, at 225-34 (describing how Congress did not clearly prioritize the policy goals enumerated in the Wagner Act, which forced the courts to decide
between conflicting goals when resolving interpretative controversies).
17. See Gillman, supra note 1, at 515 (noting that the Judiciary Act of 1862 expanded
and modified the jurisdiction of federal courts).
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visions establishing rules of jurisdiction or standing that empower
judges to make important policy choices (framed as "review" of
agency interpretation of statutes)."i Legislators also include provisions in statutes that expand standing or otherwise make it easier to
get cases before judges, e.g., class action rules.1 9 Congress can make
decisions that move in the opposite direction, e.g., by narrowing
20
standing or limiting judicial review of particular provisions.
3. BroaderAttempts to Shift the IdeologicalDirection or Role Conception
ofJudges.-Kevin McMahon's recent book documents President Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to make the Court more deferential to executive power and more willing to follow executive directions on rights
related issues.21 McMahon's detailed analysis of FDR's often covert
judicial policy reveals links between later rulings by the Warren Court
and the administration's efforts to manage divisions within its coalition by shifting the Court's focus to civil liberties issues.22
B. Are Judges ProducingDramatic Changes in Policy Outcomes or Merely
Reconciling Gaps Between Official Law and Legal Practices?
Instances where judges strike down statutes appear to provide the
starkest examples ofjudges exercising power at the expense of elected
officials. However, simply counting the number of laws struck down
byjudges does not provide an accurate measure of the extent to which
outcomes would have been different if the courts somehow ceased to
exist. Judges sometimes make highly symbolic rulings that reinforce
popular images ofjudges as powerful protectors of minority rights but
18. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 55-56 (1988) (stating that Congress often places administrative procedure
provisions in specific statutes); PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED

STATES 298-99 (2d ed. 2002) (describing how statutory language often sets forth the type of
procedure available to beneficiaries). Judges sometimes announce doctrines that suggest
they will not second guess agency decisions that are at least consistent with the text of
statutes. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (deferring to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes unless they are unreasonable in light of the
text or history of the statute). However, there are substantial doubts about whether judges
consistently follow such rules. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal AdministrativeLaw, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1023-29 (questioning the impact of Chevron on lower federal courts).
19. See SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 45-46 (noting that congressional legislation gave
more groups standing to challenge agency action).
20. See LOVELL, supra note 1, at 245 (stating that the legislation creating the National
Labor Relations Board included provisions that limited judicial review of some specific
types of board decisions).
21. MCMAHON, supra note 1, at 97-98.

22. Id. at 142-43.
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that do not do much to affect the way elected officials actually carry
out policies. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings striking
down flag burning statutes2 3 continue to generate much gnashing-ofteeth and political opportunism2 4 but have very little conceivable impact on real people or even on the incidence of flag burning. In the
case of the Bush administration's war policies, the Supreme Court has
so far asserted the power to review cases as a matter of principle but
has done little to cramp the administration's style by actually ordering
the release of unjustly imprisoned persons.2 5 Such assertions of judicial power may annoy or empower elected officials, but they do not
remove any significant powers from those officials.
The question of how to assign relative weight to different instances where judges strike down statutes is, of course, a vexing one,
and there is no scholarly consensus on how to do it. In his classic
article assessing judicial review, Robert Dahl discounted instances
where judges struck down statutes more than four years old, ignored
cases involving state laws, and introduced a primitive (and rather unexplained) distinction between important and unimportant statutes.2 6
The clear lines drawn by Dahl have been criticized,2 7 but no one else
has come up with an agreed upon way of measuring the relative import of judicial decisions. More importantly, no one has refuted
Dahl's conviction that assessments of judicial power need to take significance into account.
A hypothetical example may help to clarify our concerns. Consider two hypothetical American states, Teksas and Schmexas, with
identical statutes establishing criminal penalties for persons who engage in "homosexual sodomy." While the laws are identical in the
statute books, actual enforcement practices on the ground are quite
different. In Teksas, authorities make no systematic effort at enforcement of the law. State authorities regularly license bars and nightclubs that openly market themselves to gay or lesbian clientele,
despite the fact that state authorities are well aware that such busi23. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
24. House Backs Ban on Flag Burning, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at A16.
25. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that a citizen held in the
United States as an enemy combatant has a due process right, albeit limited, to contest the
underlying factual allegations of the government).
26. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
27. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policymaking, 70 Am.
POL. Sci. REV. 50, 50 (1976) (arguing that Dahl's narrow approach fails to adequately represent the Supreme Court's role in policymaking).
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nesses profit in part because they provide a setting in which persons
who engage in felonious sex socialize, occasionally as a prelude to engaging in forbidden conduct. More generally, state authorities decline to pursue persons who make it known that they engage in
criminal sexual acts. The sodomy laws are not complete dead letters.
Persons are sometimes targeted for violating the law, perhaps by
rogue cops abusing their discretion in ways that are transparently ugly,
as has been the case in real Supreme Court rulings on sodomy laws.2 8
Sodomy charges may also occasionally be added to indictments of persons the state pursues for violations of other enforced criminal laws.
While the risk of prosecution is thus small, it is not trivial, and many
Teksans complain that even a small risk of such charges is a violation
of basic human rights. Such concerns lead some state legislators to
propose repeal of the statutes. However, the repeal campaigns never
develop much momentum because lack of enforcement makes the
campaign seem mostly symbolic and thus less important than fights
over more consequential laws.
In stark contrast, Schmexas officials try much more vigorously to
enforce an identical statute. A popular governor, elected on a promise to "end homosexual sex as we know it" coordinates with the legislature's appropriations committees and law enforcement officials;
undercover police officers take part in sting operations; large rewards
are established for neighbors who "drop a dime" on suspicious sexual
activity; and children in public schools are given extensive DARE-like
training and taught to report parents or friends who might be engaging in unlawful sexual conduct. The popularity of the governor's
highly visible enforcement program propels her to reelection (in a
contest in which a large number of newly disenfranchised felons are
unable to participate).
Now imagine for both Teksas and Schmexas that a Supreme
Court announces that criminal sodomy statutes are unconstitutional
and that the Court's ruling is not defied in either state. Such a ruling
would, it seems, indicate much more significant judicial interference
with elected officials in the Schmexas case than in the Teksas case.
This seems true even though the two rulings created identical changes
in the legal status of two identically worded statutes.
The Teksas/Schmexas example illustrates the importance of taking prior enforcement patterns into account when assessing the im28. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CoNvicTiONs 379-403 (1988) (describing
the events which led to the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 1039
(1986)).
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pact of judicial rulings. It also shows that the continued existence of
statutes does not reliably reveal the underlying preferences of elected
officials. The lack of enforcement in Teksas was not simply some accident resulting from the practical difficulty of enforcing the law. The
failure of Teksas officials to take many available steps to enforce the
law indicates that elected officials were not really committed to the
policy goals expressed in the text of the statute.
The point of this overly facetious example is that the magnitude
of changes wrought by judges cannot be measured by looking only at
the magnitude of the modifications to the statute books that result
from court rulings. Observers cannot assume that the content of the
statute books accurately reflects legislators' preferences and thus cannot assume that any judicial alterations to that content thwart legislative preferences. Assessments of judicial power have to at least
consider the way law is working on the ground. Scholars also need to
consider whether lack of enforcement is the only reason a particular
statutory provision remains in effect long enough for a court to strike
it down. Of course, judicial rulings striking down under-enforced statutes can have value as symbols and as precedents. Nevertheless, their
significance is not that judges wrested power from legislators.
More attention to these issues might also correct that tendency to
talk about cases involving real states like Texas as though they are
more like our Schmexas example than our Teksas example. Rulings
like Lawrence v. Texas2 9 are sometimes attacked for interfering with the
right of the "majority" to create and enforce moral standards.3" Justice Scalia once compared the majority's interest in defining murder
as a crime to its interest in defining sodomy as a crime.3 1 Comparing
the enforcement practices of laws against sodomy and murder would
presumably indicate for most jurisdictions that "majorities" want very
different things from the two types of laws, however. The enforcement patterns in the real Texas provide no indication that a majority
of Texans wanted to effectuate a moral standard that made all persons
who engage in gay sex into felons or that Texans had much interest in
29. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
30. Id. at 603-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. In Romer v. Evans, Justice Scalia argued that
I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder,
for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even "animus" toward such conduct. Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at issue here:
moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval
that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in
Bowers.
517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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draining the public treasury by prosecuting and punishing such
persons.3 2
Recognition that some seemingly dramatic judicial rulings have
less dramatic impact on the implementation of actual policies helps to
throw into sharper relief those cases where courts directly challenge
existing practices. The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board
of Education3" upset laws that were being enforced and thus better
qualifies as an instance where democratically elected officials lost
power to judges34 (assuming, perhaps too charitably, that one wants to
call the processes for selecting legislators in South Carolina in 1954
democratic "elections"). Ironically, however, the failure of Brown to
have much effect on governing practices before Congress devoted financial resources to ending segregation a decade later suggests that
the capacity of courts to upset prevailing governing practices is quite
limited. 35 There are, however, some rulings that have led legislators
to devote considerable resources to meeting judicial standards, e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright.36 It may be that scholars could develop more
accurate measures of the impact of judicial rulings by measuring the
direct effects of judicial rulings on the distribution of resources rather
than looking to see how big a hole a ruling creates in the statute
books.
C. Do Elected Officials Decline to Use Available Counter-Measuresfor
Limiting the Reach ofJudicialRulings?
In his seminal book on judicial review, Alexander Bickel emphasized that it was the finality of Supreme Court constitutional decisions
that rendered them particularly problematic in a majoritarian system
of government.3" Scholars often note that court-imposed constitutional obstacles can be overcome through passage of a constitutional
amendment but generally regard the supermajority procedures for
amending the Constitution as so cumbersome that the option is impractical. However, reports of the finality of judicial decisions are
32. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (stating that Texas had not prosecuted anyone for
violation of their sodomy statute as of 1994).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? 42 (1993) (noting that seventeen states and the District of Columbia required
segregation by law at the time Brown was decided).
35. See id. at 70-71 (concluding that courts had no direct effect on ending discrimination or implementing other social reforms before Congress and the executive branch

acted).
36. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 20 (1962).
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greatly exaggerated. Elected officials almost always have available
other, more easily pursued options for limiting the impact of judicial
decisions. Even though many of these options are not used very often,
the availability of such controls is still relevant to assessments of judicial power. It is more difficult to conclude that judicial decisions
thwart the will of elected officials when elected officials decline to take
easy steps to limit the reach of the judicial decisions.
In some cases, legislators have options available for accomplishing their policy goals through other means. The reach of the Supreme Court's decision striking down certain kinds of hate-crimes
laws in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul" could be limited by passing sentence
enhancement statutes instead.3 9 States could also do much more to
limit the availability of abortions by passing statutes that push up
against the weaker constitutional standards that the Court announced
in Planned Parenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey.4 ° More dramatically, legislators might take institutional steps that directly attack
the powers of the courts. In the United States, the Constitution allows
Congress to pack courts with new members4" and invites Congress to
make "exceptions" to the jurisdiction of the Court.42 Congress can
also impeach and remove an uncooperative Supreme Court Justice
with fewer votes than it takes to override a presidential veto.4 3
The availability of numerous means for challenging or reversing
the effects of judicial rulings means that the finality of judicial rulings
is sometimes the result of choices made by elected officials rather than
the result of judges having any fixed power to have the final word.
The reasons elected officials decline to use their powers to limit the
effect of court rulings have to be considered before scholars can conclude that judges have thwarted the will of elected officials.
38. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
39. Compare Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479 (1993) (upholding a Wisconsin
penalty enhancement statute imposing a higher criminal penalty when the victim was selected on account of race), with RA.V, 505 U.S. at 391 (striking down a Minnesota statute
criminalizing certain racist conduct).
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Note that Casey, oddly remembered for its pronouncement
that it is not overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), upheld almost every provision of
the challenged Pennsylvania statute, including provisions that made it impossible for many
women to get abortions in Pennsylvania. Helena Silverstein, Road Closed: Evaluating the
Judicial Bypass Provision of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 24 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 73,
93-95 (1999) (concluding that minors seeking a judicial bypass from the Pennsylvania parental notification requirement are unable to receive accurate and consistent information
from the courts, which effectively denies minors their right to an abortion without parental
consent).
41. U.S. CONST. art. 11I, § 1.
42. Id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
43. Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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III.

DELIBERATE EMPOWERMENT OF JUDGES AND
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

As a means of sorting out the implications that different mechanisms ofjudicial empowerment have for democratic accountability, we
introduce in this Part a distinction between two types of decisions by
elected officials that deliberately add to judicial power: delegation to
the courts and legislative defaults. The two categories both involve deliberate efforts to expand judicial discretion or to give judges power to
resolve particular policy questions.4 4
A.

Legislative Delegation to Judges

Delegation describes cases where elected officials empower the
courts to make instrumental use ofjudicial power as a means of attaining settled policy goals. Legislators delegate if they perceive some advantage that judges have when it comes to finding an appropriate
resolution to certain kinds of policy questions.
Delegation occurs most clearly in statutes that leave judges discretion to make choices from within a specified range as they participate
in the implementation of policies, e.g., criminal statutes that specify a
range of penalties for persons convicted of a particular offense. Legislators may also delegate certain decisions to judges to take advantage
of the relative political independence of the judiciary. For example,
the election-related legal battles in Florida in 2000 provided reminders that legislators sometimes invite judges to exercise broad equity
powers to craft solutions to electoral disputes, presumably with the
hope that judges are more likely to find credible solutions than more
transparently partisan officials in other branches.4 5 Legislators can
also delegate more obliquely by placing judges in a position to evaluate and modify decisions made by other actors, e.g., administrators in
regulatory agencies.4 6 Legislators might also try to take advantage of
the fact that judges typically make interpretive rulings years after statutes are enacted and thus with a great deal more information about
how a statute actually works than the legislators who enacted it. Building flexibility into statutes allows judges to use that information to
make needed adjustments as unexpected problems arise during
implementation.
44. Our distinction between the two types of cases is somewhat stylized. Many cases will
fall between categories, and individual statutes might contain elements or provisions that
fit into different categories. The distinction is nevertheless helpful for trying to understand important connections between democratic accountability and legislative deference.
45. LOVELL, supra note 1, at xv-xvi.
46. See, e.g., SHAPmO, supra note 18, at 55-56.
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Of course, there is always some risk that judges will use any grant
of discretion to pursue their personal preferences rather than the
goals of legislators. However, that risk may quite often be worth taking. After modeling a process through which legislators might take
advantage of the information available to judges, James Rogers found
thatjudicial discretion at the endpoints of implementation helps legislators to attain policy goals even when judges are not reliable ideological allies of the legislature.4 7
B.

Legislative Defaults

Defaults differ from delegation because the reason legislators
choose to empower judges has nothing to do with the legislators' expectations that judges will help them to attain particular policy outcomes. Legislators instead invite, or at least tolerate, judicial
policymaking because they cannot (or do not want to) reach a coherent collective agreement to establish a particular policy outcome.
Legislators may default passively by choosing to do nothing when
some pressing issue arises, even though they know that inaction will
leave judges with discretion to choose among available policy outcomes. Legislators may also actively default, e.g., by enacting a statute
that appears to address some pressing problem but that actually gives
judges discretion in one of the ways described above.
Defaults are likely to occur when legislators are primarily interested in shifting responsibility for making clear choices and only secondarily concerned about which policy alternatives judges eventually
select. Note, however, that the relative indifference about policy outcomes is a collective indifference. A default can occur even when most
legislators care very much about policy outcomes. So long as there is
no effective majority in favor of any particular outcome and at least
some legislators are willing to support a compromise that empowers
judges, there may be court-empowering compromises that can attract
majority support. Note also that a default statute may pass with support from legislators with different motives. Some legislators may vote
for a deliberately ambiguous law because they do not care what policies judges choose so long as judges get the blame; others because
they are not paying attention and think they are voting for a clear law.
Many other legislators may care about policy but vote for a default
because they decide that even a small chance of winning in the courts

47. James R. Rogers, Information andJudicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction,45 AM. J. POL. Sci. 84, 93-95 (2001).
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is a more promising strategy than holding out for an unattainable legislative victory.
Note finally that judges are less likely to be corrected by elected
officials in default cases than in cases involving delegation. Since delegations are cases where there is consensus on policy goals, legislators
are more likely to care about the choices made by judges, more likely
to share in their assessments of those choices, and thus more likely to
take steps needed to reverse bad judges. In contrast, defaults are
likely in cases where there is no majority consensus on policy goals,
making it much less likely that any majority will emerge to reverse
judicial choices.
C. Delegation, Defaults, and Assessments of Democratic Legitimacy
While both delegation and defaults are problematic, delegations
are easier to defend. In a quite plausible range of cases, deliberately
expanding judicial discretion can actually enhance electoral accountability by making it more likely that the policy goals of elected officials
are attained. Delegation can also presumably improve welfare in
some cases, e.g., by fixing irrationalities or smoothing out barriers to
effective implementation. There is still room for concern. Since
judges are being given real discretion, there is always some risk that
they will not behave as expected. The threat of legislative reversal also
provides a much less direct form of control than the threat of regular
elections. Nevertheless, if the processes that produce delegation are
sufficiently transparent, and if actors in other branches pay attention
and take corrective action when the courts produce irrational or unneed not create any subpopular outcomes, delegation to the courts
48
stantial barrier to electoral accountability.
Cases involving defaults to the courts raise all of the concerns
raised in delegation cases, as well as a set of additional, more serious
concerns. The motive for defaulting is often to thwart important institutional structures that are supposed to assure accountability, e.g., by
shielding legislators from responsibility for making contentious
choices. Default only works as a strategy when it is done covertly and
48. We are ignoring, for reasons of space, the constitutional problems that delegation
across branches can create. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILIw. How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (arguing that legislative delegation to the executive branch is unconstitutional). But see George 1. Lovell, That
Sick Chicken Won't Hunt: The Limits of a JudiciallyEnforced Non-Delegation Doctrine, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 79, 80 (2000) (challenging the idea that judicial enforcement of a constitutional ban on delegation would solve the policy and political problems that Schoenbrod
identifies).
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thus raises real concerns about the transparency of the processes that
produce defaults. When legislators shift divisive social issues to the
judicial branch because they want to avoid electoral accountability for
making hard choices, their actions raise significant concerns about
democratic accountability.
CONCLUSION

This Essay has tried to get at some substantive concerns by framing them as methodological cautions. The underlying substantive
concern is that understanding judicial power requires attention to the
dynamic processes through which elected officials can shape, constrain, and expand judicial capacities, often to serve admirable goals
but sometimes in pursuit of more sinister agendas. Apparent exercises ofjudicial power sometimes mask more complicated interactions
that can only be understood through deeper inquiry into the motivations that lead officials to empowerjudges.

